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Abstract: For nearly a decade, big data has been hyped as an 
amazing new technology that will benefit corporations and 
consumers alike. By promising customized knowledge at an 
accelerated pace, big data technologies have slowly saturated the 
digital systems American consumers use to live, work, and play. Yet 
have the promised benefits materialized? An examination of the 
proposed contact tracing applications in response to the novel 
coronavirus alongside existing wearable technologies reveal that 
our trust and vulnerability, opening our bodies to be sensed by 
these networked systems, is a fraught rhetorical activity, but not 
because an omniscient system now sees us and cares for us in our 
time of grave need. Rather, the opaque system misunderstands our 
embodied rhetorical actions, is incapable of moving the American 
polis, and cannot generate the promised collective action.   
Keywords: Big Data, Contact Tracing, Control, Kairos, 
Embodiment, Procedural Rhetoric  
Introduction  
“Big data” first appeared on the Gartner hype cycle in 2011. The 
hype cycle captures emerging technologies as they move from 
“inflated expectations,” through the “trough of disillusionment,” to 
the “plateau of productivity” (Gartner, 2020). While Gartner 
focuses on the business potential of big data, this hype cycle mirrors 
the way that big data has been discussed and idealized by the public 
over the last decade. Big data, named for the quantity, variety, and 
speed of the data being collected, disappeared from the Gartner 
hype cycle in 2015 while still in the “trough of disillusionment” 
(Woodie, 2015). The author of that year’s cycle, Betsy Burton, 
explained that big data “has become prevalent in our lives,” 
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meaning it no longer deserved a place as a hyped technology (in 
Woodie, 2015). For something that is ‘prevalent,’ big data remains 
an opaque technology for most people. If asked to define or provide 
an example of big data technologies in their daily life, most would 
be unable to answer. The lack of common knowledge is not an 
accident: yes, the technology is complicated, but there are other 
issues as well. The early rhetoric about the potential of big data 
often made the case that big data would be to the benefit of 
everyone (boyd and Crawford, 2012), but have those benefits 
materialized? 
The most prolific and successful use of big data is arguably 
customized media recommendations, with services such as Netflix 
capturing viewer behaviors to recommend new shows and green 
light the production of new series and movies they believe their 
viewers will appreciate (Havens, 2014). In the arena of social 
media, the benefits and consequences of big data technologies were 
manifest after the 2016 presidential election in the U.S. (Bossetta, 
2018). Social media platforms promise free social connections to 
their users as advertisers and political action committees target 
messages using algorithmic filtering and mixed modeling 
approaches. Another class of big data technologies promises to 
know your own body better than you know it yourself: fitness 
trackers are marketed as motivators to live a better, healthier, and 
more active life (Parviainen, 2016). As Jaana Parviainen (2016) 
observed, these fitness trackers “can distance people from their 
lived bodies” while delivering on the promised tracking of bodily 
functions (p. 56). Benefits, then, might be an unfair description of 
the complicated consequences of prevalent big data technologies. 
Despite consumers being the life force upon which these 
technologies rely for their data collection, consumers are not 
treated as equal partners.  
Many scholars have looked closely at the political economy of big 
data technologies. Writing in 2007 and 2014, Mark Andrejevic has 
explored how private corporations have taken up where 
government power ends, offering goods and services that steadily 
and insidiously shape the conditions we live within. Big data is one 
small part of the overarching trend toward the domestication of all 
life through asymmetrical power relationships embedded in 
information communication technologies. The collection of data 
from users is never equal. User data is immediately the property of 
the corporate entity collecting the data to use for their own 
enrichment, whether that use includes targeting ads to the 
individual or selling that information to third parties. Additionally, 
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José van Dijck (2014) warned that big data projects are readily 
supported by the state who “leeches” information from social media 
platforms, while academics validate the enterprise by creating a 
veneer of trust in the organization through co-development of 
research projects (p. 205). Numerous scholars have called for an 
increased study of big data collection and analysis as “vital to 
appreciate the growing power imbalance between powerful and 
virtually omniscient companies and governments, and an 
individual” (Van Otterlo, 2014, p. 257). The owners of big data 
technologies control the data they collect and the information they 
share, yet it is possible the asymmetrical relationship is benevolent 
for the people embedded in the technology networks upon which 
big data technologies run. 
As the coronavirus pandemic reshaped our world, a big data 
solution was quickly proposed to help address the crisis: contact 
tracing using smartphone applications. On April 10, 2020, Google 
and Apple announced their joint partnership to create an “exposure 
notification” system using Bluetooth (Apple & Google, 2020a). The 
framework they proposed informs someone who comes into close 
proximity with an individual who later tests positive for coronavirus 
that they too have been exposed. By notifying exposed parties as 
soon as possible, the user can quarantine and prevent 
asymptomatic transmission of the virus. Apple and Google have 
promised to protect individuals’ privacy, but their new COVID-19 
contact tracing application has been met with skepticism by 
privacy-concerned activists and journalists. Many fear the 
Orwellian specter of an overreaching mass surveillance system, but 
many of the dangers arising from big data technologies are not due 
to the system’s infallibility; rather, these technologies have 
limitations that are often shrouded in scientific expertise. The 
aspiration to measure and control on a large scale has occurred 
before. Johanna Hartelius (2018) described the public discourse 
surrounding the United Nation’s “Global Pulse” big data initiative 
as “[eliding] difference between data, information, and judgement” 
that “obfuscates its own constructedness as a human measure, 
animating epistemic technologies” (p. 67). When addressing big 
data technologies, including contact tracing, it is important to 
understand what is not measured and how public health, economic, 
social, and political agendas are reinforced by the manifestation of 
contact tracing applications. 
Using a series of existing big data technologies as motifs, this 
article utilizes rhetorical tools to address the implications of contact 
tracing for the average person. Specifically, it focuses on existing 
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wearable technologies. These technologies have a variety of sensors 
that allow them to capture data about the user wearing the device, 
data which is then transmitted to a smartphone for processing into 
information: more explicitly, digestible dashboards and user-
friendly descriptions. Pervasive examples include Fitbit, smart 
watches, and even ankle straps for monitoring infants, supplying 
data from users of all ages. The digital data collection tools govern 
the bodies of those who cede their data to the system. Contact 
tracing applications maneuver in similar ways to the childhood 
development, social life, and workplace data collection systems, but 
some aspects of contact tracing make it unique from existing big 
data technologies. We now face potential threats to the American 
polis. It is a prime moment for rhetoric of science, technology, and 
medicine scholars to study and communicate the risks of trusting 
big data technology to shield us from danger in our shared moment 
of global crisis. 
Big Data and the Body 
There are numerous approaches that one can take to understanding 
big data. The technical aspects are important, but for the sake of 
understanding the role of big data technologies as rhetorical 
machines, it is important to start with sensations, sensing, and 
quantification. James Brown (2014) described a rhetorical machine 
that “takes input, applies procedures, and generates output” (p. 
497). While Brown was interrogating the rhetorical performance of 
a writing bot, his perspective is equally valuable for reminding us 
“that the boundaries between human and nonhuman continue to 
proliferate” (2014, p. 511), especially in the realm of big data 
technologies where networked arguments are formed. Big data 
technologies collect data inputs using various sensors, whether that 
be the keyboard used to collect textual thoughts on a social media 
platform or the flow of blood under the users’ skin. The input is 
then manipulated by algorithms, authored by engineers, to 
“generate and interpret” what they have found as an argument 
(Brown, 2014, p. 496). ‘Your followers have not heard from you 
lately’ or ‘make sure to get your daily steps in’ are arguments based 
on the networked technologies gathering input from the individual 
before purportedly comparing it to standards based on the larger 
community. But what does it mean for your friends to “hear” from 
you, for your physical health to “step” a few hundred more times, 
or, in our current moment, to be notified of your “exposure” to 
someone who has tested positive for coronavirus? The foundations 
of these arguments require examination to understand their basis 
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in our rhetorical activities and the implications for how they are 
received.        
Wearables and mobile contact tracing applications are an 
important subset of big data technologies that rely on a variety of 
sensors to extrapolate data about the user as an embodied actor. 
For example, the latest generation of wearable trackers regularly 
have heart rate monitoring capacity. The tracker manages this by 
directing light down into the wearer’s blood vessels located at the 
wrist, and the sensor picks up differences in volume as the heart 
beats (Rettner, 2016). Marc Gillinov, a cardiac surgeon, tested the 
accuracy of consumer wrist-based heart rate monitors and 
discovered that they can be very inaccurate, partly due to the 
“noise” generated by the wearer’s movement, ambient light, and 
muscle contractions (in Rettner, 2016). The four products that 
Gillinov tested had an average range of 33.5 beats per minute above 
or below the wearer’s true heart rate. Despite the known limitations 
with measurement, most consumers using wearables trust the 
metrics that are based on their captured heartbeat, including 
reported “stress” and “energy” levels. Heart rate is one example of a 
larger issue: sensing people in motion is very difficult, but despite a 
lack of data quality, the aggregated and compared metrics are 
eventually the basis for the arguments made by fitness tracking 
systems. 
Another underlying issue with what the wearable trackers are 
“sensing” lies in translation from what is captured to what is 
claimed. Many smartphones and wearables use three axis 
accelerometers, the electromechanical sensors that identify when 
the device is accelerating in a particular direction. Similar to the 
arguments based on heart rate, the accelerometer is equally prolific 
in its promised findings, converting the user’s motion into step 
counting and sleep quality. As Julie Elman (2018) points out in her 
article “Find Your Fit,” Fitbit uses diverse bodies in their marketing 
materials, but the actual device is incapable of measuring and 
translating accelerometer inputs in a meaningful way for 
wheelchair users (p. 3771). Even for the idealized user of wearable 
technology, the underlying assumptions whereby acceleration 
becomes a step or a marked disruption to the user’s life involve 
layers of translation and manipulation.  
Even when the technology used to sense and quantify behavior 
does not reflect the user’s innate sense of themselves, people trust 
data deeply and will reject their own intuition in the face of data. 
Theodore Porter (1996) traced the historical roots of quantification 
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to understand social life; while many assume the Western 
fetishization of data is driven by the success of quantity in scientific 
disciplines, Porter showed that quantification was created to allow 
trust across communities. Creating categories and then counting 
those categories allowed for the creation of trustworthy knowledge 
and facilitated public management and shared political aspirations. 
Moving forward to our current moment, quantification has become 
monolithic. Consumers are told to trust the numbers provided by 
wearable technologies before trusting themselves. Ian Bogost 
(2007) directs attention to another reason why wearable tracking 
technologies create trust in the resulting data. The procedure of 
daily wearing and consulting the fitness tracking application can 
“mount arguments” that have a cumulative effect on the user’s 
belief in the value and veracity of the resulting data regardless of 
the actual message. 
In the context of contact tracing applications, the questions of 
what is being sensed and how we are told to understand our bodies 
are further complicated. While a person knows when they “step,” 
can feel their racing heartbeat, and therefore levy their own 
sensation to question the sensors of wearable technologies, contact 
tracing applications are wholly opaque. For the contact tracing 
system to work, each person must be carrying a Bluetooth enabled 
smartphone (Nield, 2020). Bluetooth 2 signals have a minimum 
viable range of 10 meters/33 feet. In the American version of 
contact tracing applications, each device generates a token that 
becomes an identifier for that person: these tokens change 
frequently and are deleted after fourteen days (the assumed 
incubation period for coronavirus). When the individual comes 
within range of another person using an enabled contact tracing 
application, both phones record the other device’s token, the 
amount of time they were within range, and the distance between 
the two phones based on the signal strength (Nield, 2020). As 
Google and Apple have described their new contact tracing 
application programming interface (API), the architecture upon 
which community/regional contact tracing applications are built, 
the “app can notify you if you’ve been near someone who has 
reported a positive COVID-19 test result” using an “exposure 
notification” (Nield, 2020). The person who tests positive informs 
the application, their log of token identifiers is sent to a server, and 
then those who were exposed are notified so that they can choose to 
self-isolate and get tested. 
The arguments formed by digital contact tracing applications are 
first and foremost based on mapping device proximity to the way 
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that coronavirus is transmitted from person to person. The phone is 
sensing another device from the smartphone user’s pocket or bag, 
and the underlying assumption is that a strong Bluetooth signal 
means that the two people are close together and therefore 
vulnerable to virus transmission. There are several concerns with 
using Bluetooth as a sensor for virus transmission. First, Bluetooth 
signals are “greatly affected by the placement of furniture, 
movement of people, walls, etc. Signal strength alone cannot be 
used for estimating distance” (Patil et al., 2006, p. 635). A second 
problem is that virus transmission is dependent on factors beyond 
proximity, such as respiratory symptoms of the infected party and 
exposure through the mouth, nose, or eyes to respiratory droplets, 
aerosols, or direct contact and whether or not both parties are 
wearing a mask (WHO, 2020). Finally, there are social principles in 
place that prohibit users from keeping a smartphone on their 
person at all times: for example, the waitress who must store her 
cellphone in a locker while at work or the student whose phone 
must be kept off during school hours. Yet, in a moment where there 
is no vaccine, digital contact tracing is being pushed as one of only a 
few mechanisms to “fight” COVID-19 by providing a trace of when 
the user is exposed. These applications seem to argue that by 
tracing  the disease, we can control and purge the sickness from our 
networked social environments. 
The fight to cleanse our network is articulated in the August 2020 
marketing for the first coronavirus contact tracing application in 
the United States. The digital advertisements for COVIDWISE, 
shown in Figure 1, ask for citizens of Virginia to “add your phone to 
the COVID fight” (VDH, 2020). 
Figure 1: Digital Advertisements for COVIDWISE Application, Virginia 
Department of Health (2020). 
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The focus on the technology in these marketing materials rather 
than the person suppresses the disconnect between Bluetooth 
sensing and viral transmission and is an example of what Evgeny 
Morozov calls “the folly of technological solutionism” (Morozov, 
2013). The modern faith that a technology solution can save us 
from any ill is threaded throughout the calls to download and use 
contact tracing applications. The hand griping the phone, raising it 
high, mimics the “beacon” of Bluetooth technology, but the human 
body is otherwise removed from these calls to action. The 
individual, as an embodied actor, is not part of this “procedural 
rhetoric” (Bogost, 2007). Contact tracing applications and other big 
data technologies require access to the user to “sense” and provide 
“sensations” that support the larger goal of control, but the calls to 
use the application do not articulate the messy relationship 
between tracking, tracing, and the user’s body. Beyond problems 
with the sensing technique, there are Americans who lack access to 
expensive smartphones. Pew Research Center reported in 2019 that 
81% of American adults owned smartphones, but fewer chose to 
enable Bluetooth on their devices. The individual who cannot afford 
a smartphone is not seen and therefore not valued by contact 
tracing applications. 
Locus of Control 
Moving beyond the direct connection between sensation and the 
sensor is the larger purpose of wearable trackers and contact 
tracing applications: control of people within the network. While 
wearables appear to have a unit of focus on the individual, they are 
an example of “social engineering.” Hamid Ekbia and a team of 
computer scientists wrote that the “development of computing 
seems to have followed a recurring pattern wherein an emerging 
technology is promoted by loosely organized coalitions that 
mobilize groups and organizations around a utopian vision of a 
preferred social order” (Ekbia et al., 2015, p. 1527). In the case of 
fitness trackers, the aspirations may seem personal, but the 
technology exists as a result of pushes for fitness, health, and 
efficiency in the workplace, education, and healthcare. These goals 
need not be malicious or conspiratorial to have a power and control 
element: many workplace wellness programs encourage their 
workforce to wear fitness trackers and compete in step counting 
contests. Often described as “accountability” to the self or from 
others (Chung et al., 2017, p. 4881), networked tracking 
technologies reveal the larger system where user behavior is 
tracked, measured, and then used to make arguments to the 
 
Lanius 9  Poroi 16,1 (May 2021) 
 
individual about their place in the network (Lanius & Hubbell, 
2017). For workplace wellness programs and contests, the 
argument is not kept private, but rather broadcast to other people 
within the “assemblage” (Hess, 2015): the individual, organization, 
and co-workers are the various layers that constitute the worker’s 
identity and encourage particular behaviors and beliefs. 
 Despite the presence of control mechanisms within networked 
technology, part of the rhetorical appeals used to encourage the 
adoption of networked technology is to disguise that relationship 
under the guise of “individual agency,” “empowerment,” and a 
“culture of health” (Teston, 2016). In human-computer interaction 
research, the arguments for behavioral change embedded in 
persuasive technology are described benignly as “nudges” (Fogg, 
2002; Shin & Kim, 2018). These framings of the relationship of the 
individual to the larger network locate the locus of control, with 
attending agency and responsibility for one’s behavior, internally. If 
the user does not like the experience or the “nudges,” those 
arguments can be ignored. With contact tracing applications, 
however, the veneer of control, the stated ability to “turn off” the 
device, is uncomfortable.  
When the fitness tracker is no longer used by the individual, they 
are delaying progress on their personal fitness goals; it remains a 
rhetorically self-centered activity. With contact tracing applications, 
the network is clearly articulated and the relationship with others in 
the network exposed. Google’s “Android Help” center highlights 
this tension between the role of the individual and others 
networked by the contact tracing system. When Google writes, “to 
help understand whether you’ve been exposed to someone who 
reports having COVID-19, you can turn on Exposure Notifications” 
(Google, 2020), they concede that exposure happens regardless of 
the use of the contact tracing application. Google turns back to the 
individual control myth further down on the same webpage: “this 
system only works if you decide to use it. You control whether you 
receive exposure notifications, and you decide if and when to share 
your data” (Google, 2020). This is an uncomfortable claim due to 
its inherent contradictions: if each individual decides whether or 
not to share their COVID-19 diagnosis, then the safety of one 
individual’s health is controlled by the dyad they form with the 
strangers, acquaintances, and friends they interact with in the 
grocery store, on a street corner, and in their workplace. Contact 
tracing is an important control measure that is “fundamentally 
linked to the […] network of potential transmission routes” (Eames 
& Keeling, 2003, p. 2565), and with airborne infections, “contact 
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tracing has to be far more efficient and generally far more rapid” (p. 
2570). Individual choice, in this case, undermines the contact 
tracing systems’ ability to function, and that reality is not reconciled 
or addressed in Google or Apple’s marketing and informational 
materials. 
The state level implementations of the contact tracing framework, 
on the other hand, rely heavily on the empowerment myth. The 
North Dakota version of contact tracing, known as “Care19 Alert,” is 
built upon the Apple and Google exposure notification system and 
duplicates much of these companies’ rhetoric, but they also claim 
that “Care19 Alert quickly notifies you if you’ve likely been exposed 
to COVID-19, empowering you to make decisions that are best for 
you and your loved ones: like seeking medical advice or staying 
home” (NDResponse, 2020). “GuideSafe,” the Alabama version of 
the application, uses “power” in its appeal, coaxing Alabamians to 
help test the pilot version of the application: “The app protects your 
privacy while giving you the power to protect the health of yourself, 
your family, and your community” (GuideSafe, 2020). While there 
are only a handful of states with public messages about their 
contact tracing applications, an additional eight are considering 
adopting the Apple/Google API (Hall, 2020), and each state will 
make rhetorical decisions about how they contextualize and 
promote their version of a contact tracing application. 
A final blow to the individual empowerment narrative emerges 
with Google’s renunciation of authorial control: “Government 
public health authorities determine which factors might indicate 
exposure” (Google, 2020). The contact tracing application in 
Virginia may give different exposure notifications than the version 
used by the Public Health Departments of North and South Dakota 
based on identical underlying Bluetooth signals. Nitya Verma 
(2016) observed this general issue with “the big data mythologies—
specifically that data can offer more accurate, objective and truthful 
forms of intelligence and knowledge” (p. 505); the system creates 
“space for action influenced by what is measured” (p. 508). No 
matter what the individual does with their own device, the 
notification of exposure is bound to the testing and reporting of 
others in the network and the geographically redefined meaning of 
exposure itself. Rather than accomplishing “empowerment” and 
“emancipatory self-expression,” the “average person” is left with a 
sense of “anxiety and confusion” (Ekbia et al., 2015, p. 1538). 
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Kairos in Times of Crisis 
When they are most effective, fitness trackers come with online 
communities where “fear of shame fuels [a] performative regime” 
(Hoggett, 2017, p. 365). The rhetorical potential of fitness trackers 
is not contained in the sensor and immediate display of information 
to the user. Rather, the display of “health” and “progress” are timely 
and social performances shared on dashboards where friends and 
acquaintances can follow along. These two hallmarks of fitness 
trackers are captured by the term “social tracking” (Becker et al., 
2017). The rhetorical concept of kairos explains the first part of this 
equation: the opportune time and network occasion to perform a 
rhetorical act (Trapani & Maldonado, 2018). Rather than focusing 
on chronological time or the static architecture of the network, 
kairos helps explain why people share their data. In the case of 
fitness trackers, it can become a habitual action or a promise to 
hold each other “accountable” (Chung et al., 2017). In these cases, a 
lack of data becomes a noticeable absence or gap where the 
performance of ‘active’ and ‘healthy’ should be.  
Turning to contact tracing applications, the moment and demand 
for action is clear. In May 2020, the CDC described the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of “proximity tracking tools” being 
used in the United States and around the world, specifically noting 
the “little published empirical data showing the capabilities” of 
these technologies (CDC, 2020). Within their list of five advantages, 
the CDC mentions timelier identification and rapid isolation of 
contacts. Yet with delays in testing and slow adoption of contact 
tracing, the applications are not poised to answer the demands of 
this moment. The slide deck created by Apple and Google (See 
Figure 2) exposes this gap in timeliness. In the liminal moments 
where “Bob” begins to feel the symptoms of COVID-19, the top slide 
shows a clock and the phrase “a few days later…” before Bob has 
received his diagnosis and shares his results with the application. 
“Alice,” the stranger who Bob spoke to on a park bench, has her 
own story pane in slide 2 with a clock underlined with “Sometime 
later….”. Eventually Alice sees the notification “ALERT: You have 
recently been exposed” (Apple & Google, 2020b). The focus is 
almost exclusively on the privacy protecting technical aspects of the 
API and not on when Alice and Bob, as rhetor and audience, need 
to hear from the contact tracing application.   
 







Figure 2: Apple and Google’s Overview of COVID-19 Exposure Notifications (2020b). 
 
Lanius 13  Poroi 16,1 (May 2021) 
 
Guilt, Responsibility, and Human Motivation 
The “social tracking” of each other also leads to an emotional 
response if expectations are not met. Rather than ignoring the 
tension between different user’s expectations and resulting guilt, 
Kenneth Burke’s (1966) definition of humankind as “separated by 
instruments of his own making” helps to explore and understand 
the motives and motivations of humanity’s reliance on technology 
(qtd. in Hill, 2009). The use of fitness trackers elevates the routine 
motion of running, sleeping, and eating to a symbolic action that 
can be articulated and shared with others. Sandra French and 
Sonya Brown (2011) extend Burke to address the different ways we 
discuss control over bodies, noting the tension between symbolic 
action and motion. If our narrative does not capture and balance 
the pentadic elements of act, agent, and agency, then we end with 
“debates… about bodies, and what or who controls them, and what 
or who should bear responsibility for what happens to them” 
(French & Brown, 2011, p. 3). Fitness trackers move human 
behavior into the realm of symbolic action and allow us to create 
explanatory narratives for what and how we behave. 
 A cross-cultural comparison between the South Korean version of 
contact tracing and the American version illustrates the need for 
narratives to manage guilt, assign responsibility, and motivate 
participation in contact tracing. Anthony Kuhn, an NPR reporter, 
shared his experience living in South Korea during the coronavirus 
pandemic (in Warner, 2020). The South Korean version of contact 
tracing is not application based. Instead, the government sends out 
alerts to people who are known to live within a particular radius of 
someone who tests positive. This system is similar to how the 
Amber Alerts work in the United States. Unlike in the American 
version, positive case notifications also come with “data trails” that 
show where and when the person who tested positive came into 
contact with others. When combined with the demographic 
characteristics, “people storify this information, and they make a 
narrative out of it” (Warner, 2020). The ability to understand and 
narrativize the agent and act can lead to shame and guilt but can 
also contribute to a sense of responsibility among South Koreans. 
This sort of transparency has also improved the public’s trust in 
their government. Mark Zastrow (2020) rationalized this trend 
based on South Korea’s experience with the 2015 Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome outbreak; the South Korean government had 
to provide the information to gain the public’s trust. 
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The American contact tracing applications, however, do not 
inform the exposed person “when or where it happened” to prevent 
“personally identifiable information” from being accessed by Apple 
or Google (Nield, 2020). While the privacy concerns are valid and 
protecting biomedical big data is important for shielding those who 
are vulnerable and require treatment (Mittelstadt & Floridi, 2016, 
p. 307), it is unlikely the American contract tracing applications will 
work rhetorically without a narrative to anchor understanding and 
motivate action. 
Conclusion 
When the CDC (2020) wrote out a list of “potential disadvantages” 
of digital contact tracing tools, they mentioned important issues 
such as data security and confidentiality, technical challenges with 
device interoperability, and access to devices (some people do not 
have a smartphone or may not keep it with them at all times). The 
last trial mentioned by the CDC was the need for a “critical mass” of 
people within a community to use the application. At no point do 
they consider or interrogate the system as a rhetoric: even if the 
contact tracing mobile applications have no data privacy issues and 
manage widespread adoption, will the digital tools do the desired 
rhetorical work? Sadly, despite the desire for a technology solution 
to an unprecedented and devastating viral pandemic, contact 
tracing applications as implemented in the United States will not 
have the promised effect. First, the Bluetooth sensors do not neatly 
map onto viral transmission or how people live as embodied actors. 
Second, the locus of social control is too explicitly privacy focused 
and granular to create the necessary social trust in the application. 
Finally, the contact tracing applications have failed to use guilt or 
shame as social motivators: merely telling someone that they have 
been exposed is not enough to motivate action. The comparison of 
Apple and Google’s contact tracing application (API) to existing and 
commonplace wearable fitness trackers reveals the uncomfortable 
truth about many big data technologies: the promised benefits and 
myth of a data-driven, technologically empowered utopian society 
are not here and may never arrive.    
Copyright © 2021 Candice L. Lanius. 
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